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BOOK REVIEWS
Legal Theory. By W. Friedmann. London: Stevens and Sons, Law
Publishers; in Canada and the U. S. A.: The Carswell Co., Toronto.
Pp. 448. 1944. One pound and ten shilling.
This work by the Quain Lecturer in Laws at University College,
London, is the best of its kind in the English language. The standard
texts on jurisprudence by Austin, Holland and Salmond were of excellent service to generations of students in Britain and in the United
States, but the world in which we live in is so different from the world
in which those classics were written that an entirely new approach is
needed if the study of legal theory and jurisprudence is to remain vital
and significant. In the United States, the need for a solid treatise in
this field is no less acute. The best American legal theory is to be
found in the judicial opinions and juridical writers of Holmes, Brandeis
and Cardozo-to mention but the recent period. Since the systematic
studies of Dean Pound there has been a relative dearth of first-rate
works on legal theory and jurisprudence in the United States, and while
Dean Pound's ideas were trail-blazing a generation ago, they have tended
to become static and conservative in terms of the middle of the twentieth
century.
Dr. Friedmann has the unusual advantage of knowing intimately the
inner workings of the Civil Law countries as well as of the Common
Law. His volume, unlike that of any of his predecessors in this field,
is thus unique in that it combines the sharp analytical and philosophical
training of the Continental jurist with the urbane common sense of the
Common Law and of those who are at home in it. If the great and
standard classics on jurisprudence, written in Britain or the United
States, have usually suffered from a certain philosophical naivet6, Continental treatises on jurisprudnece have justly been charged with being
too formalistic and devoid of genuine value to the student and practitioner of the law. Dr. Friedmann has avoided writing a treatise on
legal theory by constructing a sky-scraper of legal metaphysics on the
foundation of flimsy hypothesis or logical principle, and has also managed to avoid the pitfall of presenting a jungle of facts which no ray of
philosophical illumination can penetrate. His style does not possess,
perhaps, the brilliance and felicity of a Maitland or Pound or Kelsen,
and tends to be rather matter-of-fact and straightforward. But it is
always clear, readable, and stimulating. Every page of the work is rich
in provocative ideas, and if any reader of the book can lay it aside with-
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out having felt a sensation of having gone through a rare intellectual
experience, the fault will not be the author's.
In the first part of the treatise, which forms its introduction, Dr.
Friedmann discusses the place of legal theory in relation to philosophy
and political theory, and then gives a list of the principal antinomies
in legal theory. As according to the author legal theory "stands between philosophy and political theory," it is dominated by the same
antinomies. The principal of such antinomies are individual and
universe, voluntarism and objective knowledge, intellect and instinct,
stability and change, positivism and idealism, collectivism and individualism, democracy and autocracy, and nationalism and internationalism. The analysis of these antinomies in legal theory and their
philosophical foundation is, in itself, a useful and brief guide to the
main trends in philosophy that the philosophically uninitiated reader
will find most helpful in following the subsequent arguments of the
work. Dr. Friedmann frankly avows that his approach to legal theory
is akin to that of philosophical relativists like Radbruch and Max
Weber, a position which is rather similar, in its refusal to accept absolutes and finalities, to the predominant Anglo-American schools of legal
thought. Dr, Friedmann summarizes this position in the words "Ultimate values must be believed, they cannot be proved" (p. v).
In Part II, the author gives a fairly detailed account of natural law
theories and their "search for absolute justice." There is no social rule
or institution that has not been either attacked or defended on the basis
of natural law, and the only constant element in natural law throughout
its evolution has been the change of meaning that it assuimed under
changing social circumstances. Dr. Friedmann does not repeat the
error of extreme positivists of ridiculing the idea of natural law and
branding it as rank ideology and thinly veiled hypocrisy. As he sees
it, the most important and lasting theories of natural law have been
inspired by two ideas which have materially enriched the stock of human
civilization: the idea of a universal order governing all men, and the
idea of inalienable rights of the individual. In this sense, natural law
principles are not mere fancy, but, frequently at least, anticipations of
positive law. Thus, the natural law principles of Locke and Paine became positive law by being included into the Constitution of the United
States. As to the problem of a legal order for the whole world, Dr.
Friedmann comments as follows: "If and when the whole of mankind
becomes legally organized, certain principles described by Grotius and
others as natural law, and to-day described by more modest names such
as 'general principles of law,' will become the foundation of the highest
positive law emanating from the international sovereign" (p. 20).
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Part III of the book (pp. 63-116) presents, first, a discussion of
German transcendental idealism, and, then, of scientific idealism. This
section of the treatise will prove very heavy going to most readers. This
is due to thi complexity and obscurity of the material covered rather
than to obscure expression of the ideas involved. In particular, the
reader is advised to peruse the analysis of Hegel's legal philosophy as
carefully as possible, because his influence has been enormous not only
in his own country, but also in other countries, including England and
the United States. The discussion of the neo-Kantian legal philosophies
does not come up to that of Hegel and the neo-Hegelians. In particular, it would seem that Kelsen's contribution to legal thought is
not adequately grasped by Dr. Friedmann. Important ag this part of
the treatise is, this reviewer does not hesitate to advise prospective
readers that this rather heavy discussion of philosophical and metaphysical problems is not essential to the main argument of the work,
and might conceivably be omitted in the first reading.
Part IV (pp. 117-226) scrutinizes the "impact of modern social
developments on legal thought." Dr. Friedmann examines the leading
schools of legal theory in France and Germany as well as in England
and the United States in the last three or four generations. In each
instance, he is anxious to demonstrate that legal thought is not the
product of speculation in a social vacuum, but the result of dynamic
social forces and changes that find expression in varying juridical ideas
and ideals. The American realists are sympathetically presented as are
the main ideas of Holmes, Pound and Cardozo. The author manages
to show how the basic propositions of the realists are related to cognate
conceptions emerging in Europe somewhat earlier, both in France and
in Austria and Germany, and thus he dampens somewhat the enthusiasm
of those uncritical adherents of the realist school who saw in it an unprecedented and revolutionary break with traditional legal thinking.
Part V (pp. 227-249) deals with modern political movements and
their legal ideas and concepts. In it, Dr. Friedmann examines first
socialist legal thinking, as it- can be deduced from the works of Marx,
Engels, Renner (the president of Austria as this is written), Menger,
and Soviet jurists like Pashukanis. Next, Dr. Friedmann analyzes the
legal theories of Fascism and National Socialism. Those who still hold
that Nazism was the work of one or several devils, with the masses of
the German people playing the part of innocent by-standers, will be
amazed by the long heritage in German thought that characterizes the
leading tenets of Nazi legal ideas and institutions. The author earns
our special gratitude by mentioning the contribution of Dr. Carl Schmitt
to the Nazi conceptions of law and justice. He was one of the most
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gifted German thinkers of his generation, his brilliance being matched
only by his complete lack of character and good faith. In 1919, Schmitt
was a near-Communist. In rapid successoin, he then became a Social
Democrat, Liberal, Conservative Catholic, Nationalist, until he embraced, in 1933, the ideology of Nazism. When the Nazis were in
need of a legal theory under which contracts and statutory rights and
obligations could be violated under the pretext of a new, and superior,
principle, Carl Schmitt formulated the theory of "concrete order thinking" (konkretes Ordnungsdenken) which replaced "legalistic" thinking
as it had prevailed in pre-Nazi Germany. When German imperialism
prepared for the enslavement of the world before 1939, Professor
Schmitt obligingly helped out with a new theory of "great space order
of international law" (voelkerrechtliche Grossraunordnung).
Part VI (pp. 250-384) is, in many ways, the most interesting of the
whole work. Here, Dr. Friedmann comes to grips wtih some of the
fundamental modern conceptions that have molded the Common Law,
especially in England. Public policy, social security, freedom of trade,
corporate personality-these are but a few issues that the author treats
in this section of the book. A wealth of interesting cases is cited by
Dr. Friedmann at every step of his discussion. Since his work was
published, England has, in the meantime, voted the Labour Party into
office, thus expressing a change or, at least, acceleration of ideas not
sufficiently noticed abroad. The American lawyer and law student will
find this part of the treatise indispensable to an understanding of legal
developments as they are likely to occur eventually, perhaps fairly soon,
in the United States, too. The hotly debated issue of administrative
law will command particular attention from American readers.
The seventh (and last) part of the work (pp. 385-441) deals with
"legal theory and some problems of our time." The two most interesting topics discussed are the problem of state sovereignty and what
the author calls "legal values of modern democracy." Dr. Friedmann
published in 1943 a first-rate book on The Crisis of the National State
in which he took a position on the issue of national sovereignty which
is being gradually accepted by more and more people now that the terror
of world suicide and world destruction by atomic energy has struck
deep into all of us. In his final discussion of the legal values of democracy, the author emphasizes the intimate relationship of democracy with
the Rule of Law. Both depend, for their very existence, on each other.
In the opinion of this reviewer, Legal Theory marks a milestone in
the jurisprudential literature in the English language. Dr. Friedmann
combines encyclopaedic knowledge with analytical subtlety, and he has
the ability of raising the world of law from the level of craftsmanship
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to that of art and philosophy. The wide range of his interests is indicated by the topics cited in this review, and only a limited selection
could be presented here for reasons of space. If practicing lawyers
look for a treatise on jurisprudence that is practical enough to be of
professional interest, and stimulating and delightful enough to be read
with sheer pleasure, if law schools look for a suitable text on jurisprudence that will help to train better lawyers and better educated citizens
-here is the book.
WILLIAM EDENSTEIN.

University of Wisconsin,
Department of Political Science.
Full Faith and Credit, the Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution. By
Mr. Justice Jackson. New York: Columbia University Press. 1945.

Pp. 60. $1.00.
It is not often that the legal profession is favored with an "off the
record" opinion by a member of the United States Supreme Court as to
what that court should do with a vital clause of the Constitution. That
privilege is given to the bar in this little book1 by Mr. Justice Jackson.
After giving an historical review of the manner in which the full
faith and credit clause became a part of the Constitution and after considering the statutes supplementing it, as well as the Supreme Court
decisions construing it, Mr. Justice Jackson urges lawyers not to permit
this, what to him is the "lawyer's clause" of the Constitution, to become
the "orphan clause." 2 The Justice finds that the clause has not received
its due in legal literature or in the law school curriculum, that it has
been neglected by lawyers and overlooked by judges who "not infrequently decide cases to which it would apply without mention of it."
This tendency he states has developed as a result of lawyers arguing
cases and courts deciding them on the basis of the common law of conflict of laws. A generous application of foreign law under conflicts
rules has forestalled pursuit of many questions as constitutional ones
under the full faith and credit clause.
The Justice tells us that most of the litigation concerning the full
faith and credit clause has related to the res judicata effect to be given
judgments of a sister state. In that field he finds a substantial 'body of
law which he concludes does not depart essentially from the principles of
the clause. Assuming the court of the forum is in accord with the juris'The book is a recording of the fourth annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture
delivered by the Justice before the Assocation of the Bar of the City of New
York, December 7, 1944.

60.
3P. 4.
2P.
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dictional finding of the court rendering the judgment the full faith and
credit clause has resulted in the enforcement of the foreign judgment
even though the original suit was based on a cause of action contrary
to the public policy of the forum. But, he says, the full faith and credit
clause was not intended to apply to judgments alone. Certainly full
faith and credit must be given to the statutes of the sister state and the
Justice concludes the decisional law of a state is in equal standing with
the statutory law under the full faith and credit clause. Decisional law
should be entitled to full faith and credit not only as res judicata of the
particular rights controverted but should be given the same full faith
and credit as the statutory law of the state for "what is entitled in
'4
proper cases to credit is the law of a state by whatever source declared.
Mr. Justice Jackson is concerned that a Mr. Green's estate might be
taxed upon his death by several states claiming domicile; that a Mr.
Williams may be validly divorced in Nevada but guilty of bigamy in
North Carolina; that California may apply its own Workmen's Compensation law to an employee injured in Alaska whose territorial statutes say the injured employee's sole remedy shall be under the local
compensation laws. He is far from convinced that the federal courts
are powerless to relieve the harassed taxpayer. He questions the policy
of determining which of two conflicting divorce decrees is to prevail on
the basis of "state interests" and he likewise doubts the soundness of
choosing one of two workmen's compensation statutes "by appraising
the governmental interests of each jurisdiction and turning the scale of
decision according to their weights." 5
Mr. Justice Jackson urges that the proper approach to these troublesome problems is to bear in mind that the policy ultimately to be served
in applying the full faith and credit clause is the "federal policy of a
'more perfect union' of our legal systems. No local interest and no
balance of local interest can rise above this consideration." 6 The ultimate answer to Mr. Justice Jackson is not a balancing of state interests
but a consideration of "state relations to each other and to the federal
system." 7 Even when the conflict of decisions proceeds on conflicting
findings of fact, as for example domicile, he contends that there is a
"federal interest distinct from that of either state." This being so he
suggests that the United States Supreme Court when interpreting the
full faith and credit clause should sustain the decision of that state
court which conforms with the federal interest and should reverse the
decision of a state court which does not so conform. The Constitution,
'P. 20.
S P.27.
"P.40.
5s.
aP.
'P.50.
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he says, is not concerned with whether Mr. Williams or Mr. Green are
domiciled in state A or state B, but he declares, "I do think that the
federal interest is concerned that a Mr. Williams and a Mr. Green have
some place in our federal system where they really belong for fixing
their legal status and determining by whom they shall be governed."
In concluding Mr. Justice Jackson warns that "any hope we may
have for a truly national system of justice" 10 which would eliminate
the absurdities of the taxation, divorce and other cases is in the application of the full faith and credit clause in such a way as to protect the
federal interest of a more perfect union.
The book points out a possible exit from the morass and confusion
in which we now find ourselves. Coming from a member of the nation's
highest court it has far more than usual significance for, unlike the
ordinary case, here is an instance where the means of relief have been
suggested by a person not only competent but in a position to apply his
own remedies. Whether Mr. Justice Jackson's views are shared in by
any other members of the court we are not advised, but it is not too
much to hope that such is the case and that in the not too distant future
the "federal policy of a 'more perfect union' of our legal systems""
will find expression in the opinions of the Supreme Court.
HERBERT R. BAm.

University of North Carolina Law School,
Chapel Hill, N. C.
Labor Policy of the Federal Government. By Harold W. Metz.
Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 1945. Pp. ix, 284.

$2.50.
The national government operates in the field of labor under many
unrelated laws, shaped by diverse forces, enacted at different times to
attain various objectives, and administered by agencies independent of
each other. The author, whose words I am paraphrasing,1 attempts a
systematic study of these governmental activities "on a subject matter
basis, not on the basis of the individual statutes or agencies involved."
After a brief historical survey, he considers in successive chapters what
the national government is doing about concerted action of employees
(the right to organize, strikes, etc.), collective bargaining and the collective agreement, union organization, the labor market, union preference (closed shop, etc.), wages, hours and child labor and safety, and
the settlement of labor disputes. A concluding chapter summarizes.
IP.
51.
10 P.60.
12
1

P. 47.

Introduction, pp. 1 ff., especially 3 and 4.
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"major trends." The author's "major interest" is not descriptive. And
he asserts that he is not concerned with the desirability of governmental
policies or the effectiveness of means toward ends. His purpose is to
find out whether governmental activities in the labor field "supplement
one another, or whether inconsistent objectives are being pursued."
Administrative machinery is given only incidental treatment; but the
author seeks to discover and base his conclusions upon "what agencies
actually do, not merely what they say they do." All this in 284 pages!
A collation and accurate summary, for each of the topics treated, of
relevant laws and decisions, would be extremely useful to legislators,
governmental officials, lawyers, businessmen, workers and union officials,
professors, and students. Demonstrations that what agencies do differs
from what they say they do (and that the reasons they give differ from
their real reasons for their actions) would enhance its value. If the
author supplied all this to us (could he, when he treats administrative
machinery but incidentally?), we could check his judgments about the
consistency of governmental objectives. Even if we disagreedi we
should be grateful for the study upon which these judgments were
based.
No such ,gratitude is due the author. The book is superficial and
inaccurate. It abounds in value judgments disguised as statements of
fact. Most of its statements are doubtless accurate and not "editorialized
news"; but so many are either inaccurate or editorialized or both that
all are suspect. Because there is great need for such a study as this
purports to be, the book will probably be read widely; unsound judgments
2
about governmental activities and policies will be the result.
The author's most egregious blunder occurs at page 146. The point
is an important one-whether or not the National Labor Relations
Board compels employers to grant closed shops. The author says it
does. He cites, in support of his statement, a Board decision, the most
cursory reading of which would reveal that it holds just the opposite.
The book:
Although the act appears only to make cosed-shop agreements permissible, the Board has taken a different view. In some cases it has held
that an employer failed to bargain collectively where he refused to grant
a closed shop when the union requested it.
The Board decision, InternationalFilter Co., 1 NLRB 489, 499:
The respondent's position that meeting with union representatives ipso
The Falk Foundation granted the funds which made possible the study. The
Brookings Institution, in publishing the book, doubtless relied upon the fact that
a co-operating committee composed of Lewis Meriam, Meyer Jacobstein, and E. G.
Nourse assisted the author and upon the fact that "the manuscript had the benefit
of a careful reading by Professor William M. Leiserson of Johns Hopkins University."
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facto draws it into a closed shop agreement is too specious to merit serious consideration. Our experience has been that the cry of "closed
shop" is constantly being raised by employers who seek an excuse to
evade their duty to bargain collectively under the Act and to obstruct
and deny the right of employees to do so. There is not an iota of evidence that the union representatives in this case proposed a closed shop
as part of an agreement. The respondent never permitted the chosen
representatives of its machinist employees an opportunity to propose
anything. The Act requires that the employer bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees by entering into negotiations with
them in good faith with the bona fide purpose of making an agreement
concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment. An unfounded apprehension that employees may
demand a closed shop is no excuse for a flat refusal to bargain
collectively.
The Board's holding, it bears repeating, was that "An unfounded apprehension that employees may demand a closed shop is no excuse for a
flat refusal to bargain." And this is not a case discovered by the reviewer and cited by him to refute the author; it is the very case cited
by the author as authority for his statement that the Board does not
merely view a closed-shop agreement as permissible, it requires employers to make such agreements.
This blunder does not stop here. On page 72 it appears in changed
form: "On a number of occasions the Board has held that an employer's refusal to grant a closed shop demonstrated his bad faith." To
support this, the author quotes, out of context and with obviously misleading effect upon the uninitiated, the second sentence of the passage
I have quoted from the International Filter case: "Our [the Board's]
experience has been that the cry of 'closed shop' is constantly being
raised by employers who seek an excuse to evade their duty to bargain
collectively under the act and to obstruct and deny the right of employees to do so." Contrast the implications of this in its new context
on page 72, shortly after the sentence quoted at the start of this paragraph, with its meaning when read in its original context, the excerpt
quoted above from the Filtdr case !3
Other cases are miscited (I shall not take time to demonstrate the
errors) and the blunder is blown up so that it involves clauses, in col'There is but one intervening sentence in the text on page 72: "Thus it [the
Board] has said that his refusal to grant a closed shop did 'not evidence a serious
attempt upon the part of the respondent to come to an agreement with the union.'"
This purports to be a quotation from the Board's decision in the Jackson Daily
News case, 9 NLRB 120, 128. Actually the quoted part of the Board's sentence
had a subject very different fromi that which the author gives it. The incompletely paraphrased first part of the Board's sentence actually is: "The respondent's actions throughout the negotiations, particularly the refusal to meet with a
committee of the employees, and the refusal even to discuss a closed-shop contract
do not evidence," etc. (Emphasis supplied.)
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lective agreements, about matters other than closed shops. *At page 82i
under the heading Conclusions, the following occurs:
According to the National Labor Relations Board, the test of whether
the employer bargained collectively i3: Did the process of bargaining
actually result in a collective agreement? If it did not, then the Board
attempts to discover whether the employer failed to grant desirable demands of the workers or whether he demanded the inclusion of undesirable provisions in the agreement. If the employer did either of these
things, he is assumed to have refused to bargain. This approach tacitly
involves the possibility of compulsory arbitration, whereas the National
War Labor Board frankly engages in compulsory arbitration.
So, the WLB is frank, the NLRB is devious I This, if only it were
not all untrue, would be a fulfillment by the author of his promise (p.
3) to discover "what agencies actually do, not merely what they say
they do."
Large portions of the chapters dealing with concerted action, collective bargaining, and union organization consist of one-sentence
digests of NLRB decisions. Interspersed are explicit and implicit condemnations of the Board. It allegedly (the cases cited do not prove the
allegations) "chisels" on Supreme Court rulings: "The Supreme Court
has held that this practice of the Board is improper [the Sands Mfg.
Co. case, 306 U. S. 332, is cited], but nevertheless the Board has continued to follow it" (p. 39). "These decisions of the Court [the Virginia Electric and Power Co. cases, 314 U. S. 469 and 319 U. S. 533]
have only a limited significance, since the Board is generally able to find
the existence of coercion by considering employer utterances in connection with his other actions" (p. 36).
The author reads the Wagner Act inexpertly. He castigates the
Board for disagreeing with him about its interpretation without troubling to check whether the courts -agree with the Board. At page 37
these remarkable statements appear:
The act obviously prohibits actual employer domination of a union, but
the Board even considers that an unsuccessful attempt at domination is
an unfair practice. . . The act on its face prohibits only an actual
domination of a union by an employer. But the Board has interpreted
this provision to constitute a prohibition against any attempted interference with the right to organize.
Fortunately, in this instance, the reader can judge for himself; Section
7 and the first three subdivisions of Section 8 are set forth on page 33.
Another illustration, from page 38: According to the Board, Section

8(3)
forbids the employer to affect or change an employment relationship
because of the employee's union membership or activity.
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This, the author thinks, is outrageous. The Board should require proof,
not that discrimination in hiring or firing was intended to encourage or
discourage union membership, but that it actually had that effect. Moreover, the Board should not "assume the existence of the intent to discriminate" when it "finds that any action was taken by the employer on
the basis of union membership." (It should not assume X when X is
proved?) The author believes that
Such an interpretation certainly makes the prohibition much broader
in actual application than the words of the statute seem to warrant.
Sometimes the author misleads uninformed readers by withholding
for many pages a qualification he knows must be made of an over-broad
statement. At page 40, the right to strike is said to include the "right
to return to work if and when" the strikers "so desire." That this is
not true of so-called economic strikes and is true only of strikes caused
or prolonged by an unfair labor practice of the employer is not disclosed
until page 49.
The author's statement (p. 54) of the Meadomtoor Dairies case,
312 U. S. 287, in which it was held that peaceful picketing could constitutionally be enjoined when past picketing had been enmeshed with
violence, is:
Where force and violence are a part of a labor dispute, a state may
permit its courts to enjoin picketing that contributes to such violence.
Though violence has .occurred as a consequence of picketing, peaceful
picketing cannot be forbidden.
Does the author think that the case stands for the opposite of what it
holds? Or has he merely stated its holding ambiguously? The uninformed reader, I suspect, will be misinformed, in either case.
During the war, the War Labor Board successfully resisted judicial
review of its decisions by contending that they were unenforceable. 4 Our
author, at page 62, makes the uninformed reader think that the court's
so holding grieved and perhaps chastened the Board:
The Board takes the attitude that its decisions constitute binding directives that the employer must obey. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has held that its decisions are unenforceable and
constitute only advice.
Minor inaccuracies mar the book's treatment of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. That law covers workers engaged in the production of
goods for interstate commerce and workers engaged in commerce itself.
At page 174 the "in commerce" coverage is ignored. At page 213, a
correct statement appears. Imprisonment for 6 months or less is said
'NWLB v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 144 F. (2d) 528 (1944).
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at page 213 to be one of the sanctions of the act; the section cited
authorizes imprisonment only for an offense committed after a prior
conviction. The act does not, as stated at page 224, prohibit the employment of underage children "in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for such commerce"; it reaches child labor only
indirectly by forbidding interstate transportation of goods produced in
an establishment in or about which underage children were employed.
(The coverage of the two earlier child labor laws is incorrectly stated
on page 12.)
The author has never heard of the huge back log of undisposed cases
which has resulted from the near breakdown of the Railroad Adjustment Board. Without a supporting citation, he says, at page 246: "It
appears that the Board has performed its function in a reasonably
satisfactory manner."
The government seizure of a plant affected by a labor dispute constitutes, in the author's mind, "confiscation." The context (pp. 265266) suggests to the reader that this really means a permanent taking,
without compensation.
The Conciliation Service, the author believes (p. 267), has "sanctions available to compel the parties to accept" its suggestions. No
citation gives a clue to how he picked up this fundamental misconception of what is probably the Labor Department's most important
function.
Again, "almost any lockout by an employer is prohibited." There
is no citation to support this absurd statement on page 273. Lockouts
aren't fashionable, or profitable, nowadays, it's true. But ...
These illustrations should suffice. They could be multiplied. And
doubtless there are a great many misstatements just as bad that the
reviewer did not catch. He, like other readers, will probably carry
through life misinformation picked up from the book and not recognized as such. The Brookings Institution should do something about
it. What? Recall the book? Prepare and send to each purchaser
extended "errata and corrigenda"? Sponsor, and publish the results
of, a study of the same scope (perhaps less ambitious, perhaps descriptive only) by a competent, careful scholar? It is to be hoped that
the Institution's governing officials ponder these questions deeply.
DOUGLAS

B.

Professor of Law, Duke University.
Former Solicitor, United States Department of Labor.

MAGGS.
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The Coming of World Control. By Nicholas Doman. New York and
London: Harper and Brothers. 1942. Pp. x, 301. $3.00.
Professor Doman has tackled the most difficult problem that any
student of world politics can possibly tackle today. And it cannot be
said that he has made it any easier by his method of treatment. In the
course of 293 pages he introduces so many subsidiary ideas, so many
pros and cons supported by- citations from world history and by quotations of everybody from Pope Gregory VII to Dr. Robert Ley, that his
main line of reasoning is almost completely obscured. Add to that his
involved style, his heavy vocabulary and redundancy, and you have
about as indigestible a dish as has ever been served to the innocent
reader.
The burden of Mr. Doman's argument seems to be this: world control, or world government, is coming, whether we like it or not; and
the second World War is the crucible from which it will emerge. World
War II is (or was) not just a war between nations, but a "war beyond
nations, a war of political, economic and ideological forces functioning
without geographic limitation. Its purpose cannot be, and its outcome
will not be, a re-revised relationship of nation states, but a new political
device to supplant the traditional order." This new device is definitely
not a mere League of Nations, or United Nations Charter, but something in the nature of a World State.
So far so good. Since there is no time limit on the prophecy, the
writer cannot be proven wrong. But prophesies are nevertheless dangerous. If Mr. Doman had waited to publish his book after the surrender of Germany and Japan, after the Potsdam Agreement, and after
the dropping of the atomic bomb, his premises and therefore his conclusions might have been somewhat changed. In any case, he would
have saved himself a lot of purely speculative argument.
There is much to be said for the historical approach to a subject
which is usually presented on the basis of sheer desirability, or wishful
thinking. Mr. Doman points out that the present preponderance of
"nation-states" in the world is comparatively new and probably ephemeral. But his conclusion that we are now seeing a decline of nationalism is hardly borne out by recent events. There is accumulating
evidence that Soviet Russia is entering its heyday of nationalism; that
nationalism in eastern Europe is still on the rise; and that there are
budding nationalisms in the Middle and Far East.
Another controversial feature of the book is the author's emphasis
on the virtues of war. "Wars," he says, "have been equally responsible
for retrogression as well as for the most glorious and progressive pages
of history." No paramount issues are ever settled without war or rev-
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olution. Is it therefore too much to expect that total war will help to

plow the furrow of a freer universal order?
This seems to ignore the less conspicuous but nevertheless great evolutionary changes which have set in motion the emancipation of labor,
the redistribution of wealth through taxation, and the beginnings of
socialism in Britain and France. It is true that the unification of
national and multi-national states has usually been the result of conquest. But the federation of the American colonies did not grow directly out of war. It grew out of the economic necessity for union,
duly recognized by the Founding Fathers, who used persuasion and not
force.
However, Mr. Doman believes that "only a world war, a total war,
can clear the world for the rule of one of the universal systems of life
(sic). .

.

. An easy victory, without full mobilization of resources,

cannot lead to the desired objectives of a universal democratic society."
"The first World War," he says elsewhere, "had apparently not wrought
enough havoc to animate a true and universal political and economic
system."
Refreshingly, Mr. Doman does not present a blueprint of such a
system. It seems that he means something more than "federal union."
Any "limited application" of the federal idea, either in a functional or
a geographic sense, would be "unthinkable." In other words, a world
union only for the purpose of preventing war is not enough. And the
exclusion of the non-democratic states (as proposed by Clarence Streit)
would divide the world into two hostile camps.
That is almost certainly true. But Mr. Doman presents no alternative (except coercion) to the likelihood that certain states, like Russia,
might refuse to join up. All through his book he deals with Russia as
a rather negligible factor. He seems to write off the Russian revolution and consider only the problem of Nazism. "Far from spreading
communism all over the world," he says, "the Communists were put on
the defensive. .

.

. Nazism, however, out of a domestic revolution,

has risen to the height of a world revolution." (This, even for 1942,
seems to me a very bad guess.)
However, Mr. Doman had little doubt that the Allies would triumph; and that they would then possess a virtual monopoly of armed
might. But the possibility of a clash of interests among them after
the war, was only "a possibility worth considering." Yet that is the
very nub of the problem today. The Nazis are defeated; the Allies
have a monopoly of power-but they are divided among themselves to
an extent where we must doubt their ability to make.a joint peace.
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In those circumstances, how can we accept the prognostication that
this total war will be the "mother of universal civilization"?
We can only conclude that Mr. Doman, for all his historical determinism, is another of the great wishful thinkers of our time. As he
himself points out, every age has its prophets of universal peace, or the
world state: "Projects for perpetual peace come mostly in times of
major wars, and in addition when the repercussion of war have wrought
adverse changes in the life of the peoples."
At the present writings, the changes following the second World
War promise to be definitely adverse.
CtSAR SAERCHINGER.

New York City.
Studying Law. By Arthur T. Vanderbilt. New York: Washington
Square Publishing Co. 1945. Pp. viii, 753. $4.75.
The editor of this interesting and valuable volume writes a delightful introduction and states the book is suggested by the returning veterans, including those who will take up, or complete, their law study,
and those who have come back to their law practice. For both of these
classes it is necessary that a recurrence to fundamental principles in the
law be had and that those who contemplate beginning the study of law
should also contemplate seriously the facts of the profession, as well as
the course that they must take in order to begin practice. No other
editor has collected from the masters such valuable instruction and help
for the beginner and the practitioner.
This volume contains an apt and fitting excerpt from Beveridge, with
a history of the periods of development of the bar in England from
Zane, and a modern discussion of the elements of law, by Monroe
Smith. From Smith is taken his discussion of jurisprudence, beginning
with the ancient law, with a sensible treatment, in short form, of the
developments of the elements of law up to, and including, codification
in the United States.
Then follows an introduction to American Law, by Roscoe Pound.
This begins with fundamental conceptions and runs through the history
of the common law until it became a sceintific system. Dean Pound then
gives a survey of the social interests that have grown into the law and
the growth of such interests in our present system.
Dean Pound also furnishes a chapter on the interpretation of statutes. Treatises on the interpretation of statutes are usually dry and
uninteresting. The practitioner does not often consult them, unless his
case sends him there. Dean Pound has made his thoughts on interpretation of statutes, not only clear, but interesting.
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The difficult question of determining the ratio decidendi of a case
clearly appears from the contribution by Arthur L. Goodhart. This
subject is usually referred to by speakers and writers on legal subjects,
but a few stop long enough to help either the student or the practitioner
in his search for that which determines the applicability and value of a
citation. The terms used to explain -this difficulty Usually make a fog
instead of a clear exposition of the ways and means of determining the
value of judicial precedent. The subject is full of pitfalls, not only for
the student, but for the seasoned lawyer, and this treatise will help guide
both students and practitioners.
The use of decisions and statutes in trials, as well s ir the office,
takes a forward step in Chapter 8, by Eugene Wam.-,gh.
A prophesy as to what jury-trial rules of evidere will be in the
next century, by John H. Wigmore, shows the trend o- modern thought.
Mr. Wigmore's rules may, or may not, be adopted, but his discussion
of them is both helpful and useful.
Were nothing else in this unique volume than the discussion of prelegal education, by Arthur T. Vanderbilt, and Finding Your Place in
the Legal Profession, by Charles B. Stephens, it would be valuable.
There are so many vagaries and lay-theories and free advice that are
presented to the law student and the young practitioner that he finds
himself in a maze in which he cannot determine his way. These articles.
are safe guides, furnished us by those who have had the experience
necessary to qualify them to instruct the student and the young
practitioner.
Every student ought to read this book before determining fully and
finally upon entering the legal profession. He can, if he will, find out
whether he wants to enter a profession of service and not upon a money
making scheme.
It will take some time to study this book thoroughly. Both the
student and the practitioner ought to read it and re-read it and then
keep it for future study. It is well worth its price and all the time that
may be used in studying it.
L. R. VARSER.
Member of the Lumberton, North Carolina, Bar,
Lumberton, North Carolina.
Peace Through Law. By Hans Kelsen. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press. 1944. Pp. xi, 155. $2.00.
Professor Kelsen envisages a reign of
necessarily be a reign of peace. It is true
of the jungle" which knows nothing but
omnes, and it is also true that the judicious

law which he thinks would
that one speaks of the "law
the bellum omnium contra
Hooker discusses with com-
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plete gravity, the law prevailing in the community of angels, where not
merely war but even coercion is unknown-at any rate, since the events
recounted with such particularity by Mr. John Milton. But Professor
Kelsen is quite right in thinking that law as we have long understood
it, assumes the existence of men who will disturb the peace and means
to restrain them. The essence of lawlessness within the separate communities which make up humanity was well enough described in medieval England when this lawlessness was called an act "against the peace
of our Lord, the King." The people of North Carolina and other
American states will remember the time in their history when lawlessness was an act against the peace of "our Lord, the Proprietor." But
the point was the same. It was the business of government to guarantee the peace of the inoffensive citizen so far as his goings and comings
and the seclusion of his closed door were concerned. Indeed, it was in
a sense the only business of government, after Church and state had
separated.
Professor Kelsen starts from there. Peace was maintained in individual states by drastic and forcible suppression of a smaller or larger
minority which threatened it. He would extend this idea to a worldcommunity and would clothe what is in effect a world-government with
the means of protecting inoffensive communities from being troubled in
their lawful concerns by communities which are definitely offensive. For
that purpose he presents in his appendix, pp. 127-148, nothing less
than the constitution of such a government, called in this case a "Permanent League for the Maintenance of Peace."
On many points, this Permanent League is not fundamentally different from the Dumbarton Oaks project which will be sufficiently discussed in the months that are before us. But whatever other differences
there are, the capital difference for Professor Kelsen is the emphasis
he places on international courts, rather than on a Council, to secure
the goal we seek. He wishes to create a court which will have compulsory jurisdiction over nations, just as national courts have compulsory jurisdiction over nationals. All disputes whether they are called
"political" or "judicial" must be made justiciable by this court. Indeed,
he offers vigorous and forceful arguments against the existence of
"non-justiciable" questions between nations.
This is the general theme of Part I of this little book (pp. 3-67)
and in Part II he argues with equal vigor that individuals who have
been guilty of acts which would be justiciable by the international court
if they had been acts of states, shall be equally subject to this international jurisdiction. But the punishment, if one is decreed, is to be
carried out by the state to which the individual belongs and it will be
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a state-offense, again to be brought before the International Court, if
there is any failure in carrying out the punishment adjudged.
It is hard to say that Professor Kelsen is on the side of the angels,
since he predicates force as the sanction of the judgments against which
no state can plead to the jurisdiction. But he is very much on our side,
that is, the side of men of good will, to whom peace is the second most
important thing in the world, the most important being human liberty,
which includes a great deal more than voting and the freedom from
undue arrest or search. That there should be an international court
and that this court should have what no modern international court has
ever had, the power to compel the appearance of recalcitrant states and
to enforce its decrees against them, on that I should like to believe he
has constantly increasing support. Nor can he be successfully refuted
in his arguments against maintaining the difference between justiciable
and non-justiciable questions. The difference is based, as he correctly
states, on the arbitrary refusal of a state to submit a particular question
to judicial examination and can no more be naturalized than the refusal
of a private citizen to submit an issue concerning him to a court of his
own community. But whether those of us who agree with Professor
Kelsen on this point, have grown in numbers or in influence to the
point that we can reasonably hope for such a result as this compulsory
international jurisdiction, is very doubtful.
I should regard it as a great achievement, if we can establish the
doctrinal thesis that there is no fundamental difference between a "legal"
and a "political" dispute between states, even if we are compelled to
accept the fact that this arbitrary difference will be continued in even
the most firmly organized League we are likely to see in operation. It
will be a substantial advance if the international court will in this matter
by subject only to something like a "writ of prohibition" emanating
from the Council of the League, and predicated not on an essential lack
of jurisdiction, but upon the uncontrollable decision of the Council to
deal with a question directly. Perhaps the medieval writ of rege inconsulto would be a better analogy. The Council will be charged with
carrying out the court's judgments. It is not altogether unreasonable,
in, let us hope, rare and exceptional cases, to permit the Council to
decide whether it thinks it can undertake the task. I am not one of
those who will not take half a loaf, if a whole loaf is hard to come by.
Indeed, I should sometimes be satisfied with a slice, of bread. Of
course, it should be a thick slice.
In the Second Part, my agreement with Professor Kelsen is less
marked. I undertook two years ago to set forth in novelistic form
some ideas I had on the individual responsibility for war-crimes. Pro-
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fessor Kelsen has not quite got what I meant to convey (p. 110.N.).
Like him, I see no reason why war-crimes should not entail individual
responsibility as well as the responsibility of guilty national groups, and
in the very considerable discussion of this matter-a discussion at least
as old as the time of Napoleon-I have seen very few objections advanced, other than those which, being technical and procedural, beg the
question. These objections are fully and ably analyzed by the author,
and the various arguments based on the rule of nulla poena sine lege,
hussu superioris,inens rea in an excessively subjective sense, or the modern equivalent of the medieval king's irresponsibility in his own tribunals, all these can easily be shown to be less formidable obstacles than
they have seemed to those persons-for the most, English lawyerswho would prefer to abandon any attempt at fixing war-guilt on
individuals.
If so far, I find myself in accordance with Professor Kelsen's exposition, I see no reason, however, for putting a new hurdle in the way
of dealing wtih war-guilt. If the international court can in the last
resource do no more than "relax" the condemned person to the secular
arm of individual states, and must proceed against the state, if no punishment is applied, we have added serious obstacles which may well
render the whole proceedings futile. If a court can try and condemn,
it may well enough be trusted with the control of its judgments. I
doubt whether the states to which persons guilty of war crimes belong,
will be much opposed to granting power to execute such judgments once
they have agreed that the international courts shall have power to
render them.
The advantage of making certain acts connected with the fomenting
and the waging of war individual as well as national crimes, is that it
establishes an almost universal standard of conduct which bases itself
on an almost universal acceptance of several elementary moral values.
The nature of these values is best illustrated by the acts of the Nazi
hierarchy in forcing war on the world and the acts of individual Nazis
in their method of carrying on the war, both of which types of acts
were in equal measure aminated by an arrogant contempt of humanity.
That such acts may be punished before they are fully defined and
formulated in charters and codes, is in complete accord with the way
law has developed in all parts of the globe. We cannot demand of a
still nascent international law that it should be firmer and more precise
in outline than most national laws were up to yesterday, after centuries
of fairly effective operation.
While Professor Kelsen's goal is thus unexceptionable-indeed,
thoroughly admirable-it it likely that most readers will find in the book
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too great a reliance on crisply phrased propositions that have the air
of dogmas. Professor Kelsen was regarded in Germany by jurists
who dealt only in dogmas, as an empiric. We, I fear, should find that
his categories are still too universalto fit our attitudes to the material
of the law, which is the elusive and shifting fact of human conduct and
human impulse. We cannot get along without a plan but we must not
make the plan out of steel and concrete. Professor Kelsen is quite too
easily satisfied by definition and classification. Having declared that
the modern state is distinguished by the "community monopoly of
force," he disposes of non-communal, but legal, use of force by making
those who exercise it "agents" of the community, although the agency
is in most instances a transparent fiction.
In the same way, he is eager to get the "guarantees" of peace into
the form of statute or statute-like formulation. Unfortunately formulation, however logical and reasonable, will not guarantee peace. It -is an
ancient difficulty, older even than the Horatian
Quid leges sine moribus
Vanae proficiunt.
And Horace's contemporary, Vergil, who called upon his Rome to impose the mos pacis on a literally reluctant world, was well-advised to
insist upon that rather than on a lex pacis. The creation of the "habit
of peace" will come about partly by force and partly by rational understanding of its necessity and it is only after the habit has lasted for a
substantial period that we can look upon statute and procedure as a
guaranty of anything.
This in no sense means that we must forego charters and formulations until we, or the major part of us, are fully ready for them. Most
of us are now at least partially ready for them and that is quite sufficient, provided we leave a good deal to the process of future adjustments. For example, Mexico has proposed, among other things, that a
"Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations" and a "Declaration
of the International Rights of Law" be appended to the Dumbarton
Oaks Charter. Will such Declarations have value or effect? I think
they may well have both, although the formulation will not of itself
guarantee human rights any more than, we must own, our Bills of
Rights have quite eliminated the violation of the rights solemnly
announced.
But, after all, our Bills of Right have given both a goal and a weapon
to those who are engaged in the unending struggle for human freedom.
And this struggle would be less successful than it has 'been, for all its
imperfection, if there were no Bill of Rights embodied in our Constitutions, state and federal. If we-give to the new world either a Dum-
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barton Oaks Charter or such a project as that presented in this book,
we shall have the outline of a law within which people who have determined to be at peace can accustom themselves to live. It is not the
charter or the plan that will create the determination.
It is, however, a great deal to have a charter even if our grandchildren will scarcely recognize in the scheme of law they will develop,
the specific regulations, procedures and formulations to which we ourselves must still look forward as hardly more than a hope and a promise.
MAX

RADiN.

School of Jurisprudence,
University of California,
Berkeley, California.
Arbitration of Labor Disputes. By Clarence M. Updegraff and Whitley P. McCoy. Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1946.
Pp. xi, 291. $3.75.
Arbitration as the terminal point in the grievance procedure is now
generally accepted as the appropriate method of settling labor-management disputes over the application and interpretation of the collective
bargaining contract. There is a notable trend, in this connection, toward
arrangements for permanent umpires. And agreements to permit arbitration tribunals to determine the content of new contract provisions,
after negotiations fail, are more frequent. These developments have
increased the need for dependable arbitrators and procedures. This
manual, an outgrowth of the authors' experience in government and
private arbitrations, will help to improve the labor arbitration process.
It is not a large volume. The authors' text runs to but 154 pages,
embracing chapters on (1) General Introduction-Background; (2)
Selection of Arbitrators-Their Qualifications, Jurisdiction and Compensation; (3) The Agreement to Arbitrate and the Submission; (4)
Procedure; (5) Awards and Their Enforcement; (6) Commonly Recurring Types of Cases Arbitrated; and (7) Enforcement of Contracts
to Arbitrate. Appendices, in 76 pages, supply suggested drafts of arbitration provisions for basic collective bargaining contracts and of agreements for the submission of existing issues; specimen arbitration awards,
handed down by the authors and by Elmer T. Bell, William M. Hepburn, Ralph T. Seward and Young B. Smith; and classified citations to
the state arbitration statutes. A detailed index covers 44 pages.
The book's chief fault is found in the often undiscriminating statements of the law of labor arbitrations, especially on awards and their
enforcement, and on these aspects of agreements to arbitrate and submissions: capacity of the parties, future controversies, interpretation,
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amendment, modification, waiver, rescission, revocation, and enforcement.
Most of the cases and statutes cited in support involved questions relating to insurance, titles to land and other subjects of commercial
arbitration. Many are very old, of a period when the courts were unsympathetic with arbitration and when labor arbitrations were relatively
unknown. The authors concede that labor arbitrations rarely get into
court. Then why all this bland learning, with only occasional speculations as to its transferability to labor disputes, with their unique
characteristics ?1
The chief values of the volume are found in the revealing, critical
and provocative discussions of labor arbitrations in action. Sound advice is given on the drafting of arbitration provisions in basic labor relations contracts, and of submission agreements. Significant of the
constant concern for the integrity and effectiveness of the labor arbitration process is the emphasis on the arbitrator's responsibility for seeing
to it that the issues and his authority are so defined as to enable him to
settle completely the basic ramifications of the dispute. And there are
thoughtful suggestions on the handling of questions relating to seniority,
discharges, working conditions, overtime, wages and other commonly
recurring types of cases.
Two recommendations invite comment: (1) that the arbitrator be
empowered to award the costs, mainly his compensation and expenses,
in proportion to relative fault; and (2) that, in cases where the other
members of a panel are officers of the company and of the union, the
chairman's decision be allowed to control, unless the panel is unanimous.
As to the first, would not such an award irritate rather than soothe
'The Uniform Arbitration Act, as adopted in North Carolina in 1927 (Gen.
Stats. 1943, Secs. 1-544 to 567) is perhaps general enough to apply to labor disputes. It has, however, been impliedly superseded, for these cases, by the Labor
Disputes Arbitration Act of 1945 (Gen. Stats., Supp. 1945, Secs. 95-36.1 to 36.7).
This Act is silent as to judicial review. Under the Act of 1927, awards there
provided for may be vacated by the courts only for fraud, corruption, undue inL
fluence, lack of due process, bias or ultra vires. Bryson v. Higdon, 222 N. C. 17,
21 S. E. (2d) 836 (1942), in this connection, may be prophetic for labor arbitrations. In sustaining an award as to the boundaries of land, the court said: "The
courts have done all that they could in maintaining the purpose and spirit of this
sort of arbitration by liberal construction of pertinent laws. It is, of course, not
expected that arbitrators should adopt the precise methods of hearings in court or
before referees in making up their decision, and in many respects their procedure
is not reviewable by this court, as would be that of inferior courts .... The cited
cases and references therein indicate the policy of the law and the care of the
courts to liberally sustain this very effectual and valuable method of bringing controversies to an end, considering that in many instances the controversy may have
a more friendly ending and a speedier determination, and even a greater probability of justice between the litigants than may be afforded by the more belligerent methods of trials in the courts of law."
This case and the two statutes are cited in the text.
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future labor relations in the plant? As to the second, would it not be
better, especially with inexperienced companies and unions, to provide
for such control only where a majority vote cannot be obtained on any
issue ?
M. T. VAN HECKE.
University of North Carolina Law School,
Chapel Hill, N. C.
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